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Abstract 
We present two experiments investigating the production of 
implicit constructions. Using a confederate scripting paradigm 
we find that after making an inference participants were more 
likely to subsequently produce an implicature. This effect 
occurred at a global and a local level and was unaffected by 
the perceived role of the conversational partner. Our findings 
demonstrate that the choice of whether to be implicit is 
determined by the activation levels of representations specific 
to implicatures and that inference and implications have 
overlapping processing representations. 
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Inferring 
Producing implications 
During conversations speakers have to make a variety of 
decisions about the message they wish to convey. These 
decisions include what lexical material to include, what 
syntactic forms to use, and whether or not to communicate 
explicitly or implicitly. When communicating implicitly the 
onus is on the listener to enrich the utterance to reach the 
speaker's intended meaning.  
Research into language production has predominantly 
focused on speaker's choices of explicit material. That is, 
their choices of which lexical items to use or which 
syntactic constructions to use (e.g. Bock & Levelt, 1994; 
Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999; Pickering & Branigan, 
1998). In this paper, we focus on the speaker's decision to 
be implicit or explicit in their speech. Consider the 
following: 
1. A: “Did John eat the cookies?” 
B: “He ate some of them.” 
 => John ate some but not all of the cookies. 
2. A: “Have you met Lucy’s new boyfriend? He’s 
handsome and intelligent!” 
B: “He’s handsome.” 
=>He’s not intelligent. 
In these exchanges B’s utterance conveys more than what 
is explicitly coded. In (1) B’s utterance leads to the 
inference John ate some but not all of the cookies. This 
inference arises through the following steps (based on Grice, 
1989): (i) speaker A recognises that B could have said “he 
ate all of them.” (ii) Since B did not say this, and assuming 
B is cooperative, A can infer that “he ate all of them” is not 
true; (iii) combining what is said with the negation of the 
alternative leads to the inference that “John ate some but not 
all of the cookies.” Similar reasoning can be used for (2). 
Speaker B could have said “Yes, I agree” or “He is 
handsome and funny.” By not saying these A could infer 
that B thinks Lucy’s boyfriend is not handsome. The result 
of this reasoning process was termed implicatures by Grice 
(1989). 
Since Grice’s seminal work, implicatures have been 
analysed in great detail. For example, there are analyses 
from the perspective of theoretical semantics (e.g., 
Chierchia, 2004), acquisition (e.g., Noveck, 2001), clinical 
disorders (e.g. Chevallier, Wilson, Happé, & Noveck, 
2010), and sentence processing (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004). 
What all previous work has in common, however, is that 
they are from the perspective of the listener, and not the 
speaker. Here we ask how the speaker makes the choice 
about whether to make an implication1. 
Why imply? 
Why does a speaker imply when they could be explicit? One 
reason is that using implicatures is efficient for a speaker. 
Since articulation is much slower than speech preparation 
processes, reducing the amount of material to be articulated 
reduces this articulatory bottleneck and arguably minimises 
speaker effort while maximising their benefits (Grice, 1989; 
Horn, 2004; Levinson, 2000; Wheeldon & Levelt, 1995). 
Another reason is that implicatures are used out of 
politeness. Implicatures can be used to maintain face 
(Bonnefon, Feeney, & Villejoubert, 2009; Brown & 
Levinson, 1987; Feeney & Bonnefon, 2013; Goffman, 1967; 
Holtgraves & Perdew, 2016). In face threatening contexts 
listeners interpret the use of implicatures as a speaker’s 
attempt at politeness. 
Efficiency and politeness provide intuitive explanations 
for why people use implicatures. However, it is unclear how 
these socio-pragmatic factors interact with the language 
processor. One possibility is that social factors modulate the 
activation of representations specific to the implicature 
process. That is, there are representations specific to 
implicatures and the activation of said representations 
underlie the production and comprehension of implicatures. 
We present two experiments to investigate this. 
                                                          
1 We refer to implicit utterances made by the speaker as 
implications and inferences made by the listener as inferences. 
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Implicit representations 
During conversations interlocutors tend to repeat 
linguistic structures that they have recently heard or 
produced. This repetition is known as structural priming 
(e.g. Bock, 1986). Structural priming occurs throughout the 
language system in production (Brennan & Clark, 1996; 
Bock, 1986; Levelt & Kelter, 1982; Branigan, et al, 2000; 
2005) and comprehension (Sturt, Keller, & Dubey, 2010; 
Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008), and in different languages 
(Hartsuiker & Westenberg, 2000; Scheepers, 2003). There is 
a general consensus that successful priming of a particular 
structure indicates the presence of a corresponding 
representation within the language system whereas 
unsuccessful priming indicates the absence of such a 
representation (Branigan, Pickering, Liversedge, Stewart, & 
Urbach, 1995; Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). 
Priming is not restricted to explicit linguistic forms; 
Raffray, Pickering, Cai, & Branigan (2013) found that after 
encountering a coerced sentence individuals were more 
likely to subsequently produce a coerced sentence than after 
a fully-formed sentence. Sentences involved coercion are 
ambiguous. For example, "The author finished the book" is 
ambiguous; the verb finish requires a complement that 
specifies an event. For a comprehender to interpret the 
sentence they must undertake an enrichment process which 
coerces the noun into the correct semantic type.  Since 
individuals were more likely to subsequently produce a 
coerced sentence after comprehending or producing a 
coerced sentence than after a full-formed sentence Raffray 
et al. suggested that there are distinct representations 
corresponding to coerced and full-form sentences i.e. there 
are distinct representations involved in implicit and explicit 
language. While the sort of implicit language used by 
Raffray et al. is very different to Gricean implicatures, their 
study nonetheless demonstrates that it is possible to prime 
the choice between using more or less linguistic material. 
Further support comes from Bott and Chemla (2016). 
They showed that that after deriving a Gricean enrichment 
participants were more likely to subsequently derive an 
enrichment. This held both within and between enrichment 
categories. They suggested that there was a mechanism 
which underlies the derivation of enrichment and after 
making an enrichment these mechanisms retain some 
activation which increases the likelihood of making a 
subsequent enrichment. However, their findings relate to 
comprehension (and not production), and so do not illustrate 
how the speaker chooses between an implicit and an explicit 
construction. 
The success of communication can, in part, be ascribed to 
priming. Representations that are shared between the 
comprehension and production system reciprocally activate 
each other so that after comprehending a particular structure 
the speaker is more likely to use that structure. 
Consequently interlocutors develop similar representations 
of linguistic structures and thus become aligned via priming 
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004). We propose that the same 
occurs for the production of implicit and explicit 
constructions. There are specific representations which 
underlie implicit communication and the activation level of 
these determines whether or not a speaker produces an 
implicit construction. Thus in a dialogue if one speaker is 
using implicit constructions it is likely that their 
conversational partner will also produce implicit 
constructions since the representations used to comprehend 
the utterance will have an activation advantage over other 
representations that were not used. Thus these 
representations can be primed. We test this using a 
confederate-scripting priming paradigm adapted from 
Branigan, Pickering & Cleland, 2000). 
Experiment 1 
A participant and a confederate took turns describing and 
identifying a referent card from a set of four. These cards 
consisted of rectangles containing either one or two images 
(see Figure 1). Cards were displayed on two separate 
screens (one for the participant and one for the confederate), 
and neither party could see each other’s screen. The referent 
card was identified to the speaker by being embedded in a 
bold square, but not to the listener. The task for the speaker 
was to communicate to the listener which of the cards was 
the referent card.  
The structure of the images in the display were the same 
on each trial. Figure 1 shows the structure (left panel) and 
an example trial. The experimental cards were the A and AB 
cards. Here, one of the images was duplicated (a pencil in 
the example). This meant that to communicate that the A 
card was the referent, the speaker could choose between an 
implicit construction, “The card with the pencil,” in which 
they relied on the listener making an inference, or an 
explicit construction, “The card with the just the pencil,” in 
which a modifier removed the ambiguity about which image 
was the referent. Whether the participant (as speaker) chose 
an explicit or an implicit form was the dependent measure. 
There were two forms of priming. The first was a between 
subjects manipulation in which one group of participants 
were exposed to predominantly implicit constructions and 
the other to predominantly explicit constructions. The 
second was a within-subjects manipulation in which the 
sequence of trials was designed to prime an implicit or an 
explicit construction from the participant.  
Our hypotheses were as follows. If there are 
representations corresponding to implicatures, and if they 
can be activated or deactivated during conversation, we 
expect more explicit constructions in the explicit global 
priming condition than in the implicit condition. Similarly, 
if implicature representations can be activated at a local 
level, trials in which the confederate uses an implicit 
construction should be followed by more implicit 
constructions than trials where the confederate used an 
explicit construction. 
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Figure 1. Example trials. Left panel shows the object 
structure. Right panel shows an example trial. 
Method 
Participants. 35 Cardiff University undergraduate students 
participated for either payment or course credit. 
Materials and Design. On each trial the interlocutors were 
presented with four cards, each containing one or two 
images. Images were organized in the same structure (see 
Figure 1). Both interlocutors would see the same set of four 
cards however, on prime trials the confederate’s screen 
would also display the description to use. The confederate’s 
descriptions always named a single image, e.g. in 
Experimental trials the confederate would describe the AB 
card as “The card with the [B]”. Experimental trials referred 
to either the A or the AB card and filler trials referred to the 
C or DE card.  
All trials were organized into pairs such that the 
confederate described a prime trial and the participant 
described a target trial. For experimental items there were 
A, and AB primes and targets, thus there were 4 prime-
target combinations. There were 8 examples of each 
combination resulting in 32 experimental pairs. Filler items 
were 32 pairs of C and DE trials. An additional 8 practice 
pairs were presented at the start of the experiment to allow 
participants to get used to the experimental procedure. 
Consequently there were 32 experimental pairs + 32 filler 
pairs + 8 practice pairs = 144 items in total.  
Items were presented in a fixed pseudorandom order. 
Experimental pair presentation was alternated with filler 
pairs. To prevent any findings from being attributable to 
order effects we reversed the presentation order of the pairs 
to make two separate lists.  
The dependent variable was the construction used by 
participants to describe the card in target trials. Responses 
which used a single, unmodified referent were coded as 
implicit and responses that used two referents or a modified 
single referent were coded as explicit. 
Global priming. Global priming tested whether 
participants would imitate the conversational style of their 
partner. Since the A item was duplicated across the A and 
AB cards, describing the A card was potentially ambiguous. 
The confederate could either use an implicit description 
“The card with the [A]”, which required the participant to 
derive an inference (A and nothing else), or use an explicit 
description “The card with just the [A]”.  In the implicit 
condition the confederate described the A card implicitly, 
using an unmodified referent. In the explicit condition the 
confederate always used a modifier.  
Local priming. Local priming tested whether we could 
prime the implicature representations on a trial by trial 
basis. This was achieved by manipulating the sequence of 
prime-target trials. There were two prime types (A cards, 
AB cards) and two target types (A cards, AB cards), thus 
there were four prime-target sequences: A->AB, A->A, AB-
>AB, AB->A. In the implicit condition the confederate’s 
description of A cards required participants to make an 
implicature and consequently raised the activation levels of 
the implicature representations. The confederate’s 
descriptions of AB cards, conversely, blocked the 
implicature (since there was no card equivalent to B and 
nothing else) and therefore lowered the activation levels of 
the implicature representations. Consequently A->A 
sequences should yield higher proportions of implicature 
production (unmodified single referent descriptions) than 
AB->A sequences. The reverse should hold for A->AB 
descriptions; rates of implicatures should be high following 
A trials, participants would avoid unmodified single item 
descriptions for AB cards and instead use a conjunction 
(“The card with the scooter and skateboard”). 
Procedure 
The confederate was a female native-English speaking 
student from the Cardiff University student population. The 
participant and confederate were sat at opposite sides of a 
table facing a computer screen. They could not see the other 
person’s screen. The confederate and participant were told 
that they were “playing a game where they will take turns 
describing and identifying cards. The same set of cards will 
be displayed on both computer screens. If you see one with 
a bold border it is your turn to describe. To make a guess 
about which card your partner was describing press one of 
the four keys corresponding to the position of the card on 
the screen. Do not speak to your partner except to describe 
the card”. Participants were not allowed to describe the 
position of the card on the screen but, if they needed their 
partner to, they could ask for their partner to repeat their 
description.  
Results 
Each participant produced 32 target responses. Of the 1120 
responses 22 were excluded due to experimenter error. To 
ensure that participants were paying attention to the 
confederate’s descriptions we looked at key press responses 
to prime trials. Participants selected the correct card 98% of 
the time. Therefore we can be confident that they were 
paying attention to the confederate.  
Data underwent a logit transformation and were analysed 
using a 2x2x2x2 Mixed ANOVA. Prime type (A-card and 
AB-card) and target type (A-card and AB-card) were 
within-subjects factors and description form (implicit and 
explicit) and list were between-subjects factors. 
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Global priming. Participants adopted the conversational 
style of their partner. When their partner was using 
implicatures, participants were more likely to also use 
implicatures (F (1, 31) = 125.11, p < .001).  
 
Figure 2. Proportion of implicit responses in implicit and 
explicit group. 
 
Local priming. We also manipulated which card was 
described. Whilst there was no effect of prime (F (1, 31) = 
1.98, p = .169) or target (F (1, 31) = 1.88, p = .180) there 
was an interaction between prime and target (F (1, 31) = 
8.08, p=.008). When participants had to describe an A-card 
target they produced more implications after they had made 
an inference (A-prime). When participants had to describe 
an AB target they produced fewer implications after they 
had made an inference. This is consistent with there being 
specific representations involved in producing implicatures. 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of implicit responses to A and AB 
targets by participants in implicit group. 
Discussion 
The results suggest that there are representations 
corresponding to implicatures that can be activated and 
deactivated during conversation. After comprehending an 
implicature the representations involved had an activation 
advantage over other representations that were not used. 
Consequently these implicature representations were more 
likely to be used in subsequent speech production. After 
cancelling an implicature, the implicature representations’ 
activation was suppressed thereby reducing the likelihood of 
them being used for subsequent production.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 used a confederate as the interlocutor. 
However, we have no way of knowing whether participants 
believed our deception. Our results could therefore be a 
consequence of participants believing that the 
conversational partner was an experimenter. In Experiment 
2 we tested this by manipulating whether the partner was 
presented as an experimenter or another participant. 
There is range of evidence suggesting that the 
participant could be influenced by the interlocutor’s speech 
characteristics and social status (e.g. Bergen & Grodner, 
2012; Grodner & Sedivy, 2011; Holtgraves & Yang, 1990; 
1992). For example, Grodner & Sedivy showed that 
listeners were less likely to derive an inference when their 
interlocutor was judged to be an unreliable speaker. We 
therefore reasoned that our manipulation could have several 
possible effects on participants’ utterances. One was that 
participants might imitate their partner more in the 
experimenter condition. Since the partner would be in a 
position of authority, participants may feel that the best 
strategy would be to do exactly as the experimenter did. 
Previous work has shown that imitation is more likely when 
the partner has higher authority (e.g. Bandura & Kupers, 
1964; McGuigan, 2013). Alternatively, there may be less 
imitation in the experimenter condition. Since the partner 
would now be in the participant’s social outgroup, there 
would be less pressure to conform (e.g. Bourgeois & Hess, 
2008; Yabar et al. 2006). 
Orthogonal predictions can be reached about the overall 
levels of implicit language use. Participants might choose to 
use more implications overall in the experimenter condition. 
Since the experimenter would generally be in a position of 
knowledge, there would be little risk of miscommunication 
by using implications. Alternatively, participants might use 
fewer implications because if the partner were the 
experimenter, participants might feel they have to be 
particularly informative and precise in their responses. 
The basic design was exactly the same as Experiment 1. 
The only difference was that one group of participants were 
told that the partner was an experimenter and in the other 
group they were not. In the latter group, there was an 
experimenter and a confederate, whereas in the former 
group one experimenter played the role of both 
experimenter and conversational partner. 
Method 
Design and materials were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Participants. 35 Cardiff University undergraduate students 
participated for either payment or course credit. 
Partner manipulation. There were two roles that the 
conversational partner could play: participant or 
experimenter. When the conversational partner took the role 
of a participant the participant was unaware of their 
partner’s involvement in the experiment, just as in 
Experiment 1.  However, when the conversational partner 
took the role of experimenter, the participant was fully 
aware of this. The experimenter informed the participant 
that they would be playing a communication game together 
and instructed the participant of their task. 
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Results 
Each participant produced 32 target responses. Of the 1280 
responses 49 were removed due to experimenter error. 
Partner role. Numerically, participants produced more 
implicit descriptions when they knew their conversational 
partner was the experimenter compared to when they 
thought their partner was another participant (see Fig. 1). 
Despite the numerical difference this was not statistically 
significant (F (1, 36) = 1.13, p = 30.). However, experiments 
investigating social influences often have a larger sample 
than that of Experiment 2. It is possible that our 
manipulation was not strong enough, or that our sample size 
is too small. This is borne out following a Bayesian analysis 
(Dienes, 2011; 2014; Rouder et al., 2009). Using the default 
JZS prior we obtained a Bayes Factor of 0.4. This indicates 
that our data may not be sensitive enough to draw a strong 
conclusion about the partner role manipulation. 
 
Figure 4. Proportion of implicit descriptions in implicit 
and explicit group with confederate as participant or 
experimenter. 
 
There was no interaction between interlocutor role and 
conversational style (F (1, 36) = .13, p = .73, BF = 0.3).  
Global priming. We replicated the findings from 
Experiment 1. Participants in the implicit condition 
produced more implicit utterances than those in the explicit 
condition (F (1, 36) = 45.72, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.97 – 
3.65). This was found irrespective of interlocutor role. The 
global priming effect was found both when the interlocutor 
was the experimenter (F (1, 16) = 19.25, p < .001, 95% CI = 
1.53 – 4.39) and the participant (F (1, 16) = 30.06, p < .001, 
95% CI = 1.65 – 3.68). 
Local priming. As in Experiment 1 there was no effect of 
prime (F (1, 32) = .016, p = .90) or target (F (1, 32) = 3.58, 
p=.068). However, there was an interaction between prime 
type and target (F (1, 32) = 6.64, p=.015). Following an A-
card prime participants descriptions of A-card targets were 
more implicit but when the target was an AB-card 
descriptions were more explicit.  
The general pattern of results was the same when taking 
each partner role separately. However, there was no 
significant interaction when the partner was a participant (F 
(1, 16) = 3.01, p=.10, BF = 0.5) or when the partner was an 
experimenter (F (1, 16) = 4.18, p=.058, BF = 0.4). The 
Bayes Factors give no reason to suggest that these 
nonsignificant results were anything else but a lack of 
power. 
Discussion 
The main findings from Experiment 1 were replicated:  
Participants were more likely to produce implicit 
constructions when their interlocutor was using implicit 
constructions than when they were using explicit 
constructions. These effects were shown for local and global 
priming manipulations. 
There appeared to be no influence of the social status of 
the conversational partner. We found no significant main 
effects or interactions of the partner manipulation. Global 
priming effects occurred regardless of the partner role, and 
local priming effects showed similar patterns in both 
conditions but were narrowly nonsignificant. Overall, we 
can conclude that the priming effects we observed in 
Experiment 1 were not due to particular strategies adopted 
by participants disbelieving that the partner was another 
participant.  
General discussion 
We presented two experiments demonstrating that the 
production of implicatures can be primed. After 
comprehending an implicature participants were more likely 
to subsequently produce an implicature. This effect was 
replicated across two studies and was found both within and 
between participants. Whilst implicatures are an ostensibly 
pragmatic phenomenon these experiments suggest that there 
are distinct representations underlying implicatures and it is 
the activation levels of these representations that are 
responsible for the production of implicatures. 
Previous research has suggested that socio-pragmatic 
factors influence the decision about whether to use implicit 
constructions. For example, people might use implicit 
language to be more polite or to be more efficient (e.g. 
Holtgraves & Yang, 1990, 1992; Levinson, 2000). Whilst 
these factors are likely to be important, our experiments 
show that they cannot be the only factors involved. In 
Experiment 1 we did not manipulate any social factors yet 
participants systematically varied their choice of 
construction across conditions.  In Experiment 2 we 
manipulated the social status of the conversational partner 
but found no difference in rates of implicature production as 
a consequence. Taken together the experiments suggest that 
there are distinct representations underlying implicatures 
and their use is not determined entirely by socio-pragmatic 
factors. Instead, we propose that socio-pragmatic factors 
may modulate the activation levels of the implicature 
representations but further work is needed to address this. 
Finally, the priming effects we demonstrate speak to the 
interaction between deriving an inference and producing an 
implication. Inferring and implying must necessarily use 
different representations (since one involves comprehension 
and the other production) but if they were entirely separate 
we would not have observed priming effects.  That deriving 
an inference primes the production of an implication shows 
that the representations involved in the two processes 
overlap. Exactly which representations are used in both, and 
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which are restricted to the individual processes, is a topic 
for future research.  
Conclusion 
Our study makes three novel contributions. We have shown 
(1) that people can be primed to produce Gricean 
implicatures (2) that there are factors other than the socio-
pragmatic that determine whether a speaker uses an implicit 
construction (3) that inferring and implying share 
overlapping mechanisms. 
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